Are We Seeing the Warning Signs Before Appointment?
By Bert van den Heever
Over the past few months, Weekend Property & Construction News has examined a series of questions on procurement strategies, drawing on the ASAQS FAQ section dealing with the different ways in which construction projects can be procured.
We have considered traditional procurement, design and build, management contracting, target-cost arrangements, tendering methods, risk allocation and, importantly, tender adjudication.
The ASAQS Procurement Strategies FAQ makes an important point: procurement is not simply about obtaining a price. The procurement process should align the sourcing and contracting strategy with the project's time, cost, quality and risk requirements. Tender adjudication should consider matters such as contractor qualifications, experience, resources, past performance, price, quality and programme.
That series leaves us with one final—and perhaps more important—question:
What happens when we get the procurement strategy right, prepare the documentation, call for competitive tenders—and then appoint the wrong contractor?
Because once the contract has been signed, changing that decision can become extremely expensive.
The problem may begin before construction starts
When a contractor fails, we tend to investigate the failure retrospectively.
Was the tender too low? Was the programme unrealistic? Did the contractor lack management skills? Was there insufficient working capital? Were subcontractors not paid? Did the employer pay late? Was the project simply beyond the contractor's capability?
All are legitimate questions.
But perhaps there is another question we do not ask often enough:
Which of those warning signs could have been identified before the contractor was appointed?
For the quantity surveying profession, this question is particularly important.
The independent QS may prepare the Bills of Quantities, estimate the probable construction cost and advise the client on procurement. Once construction starts, the QS is expected to monitor expenditure, value work, assess variations, prepare payment valuations and forecast the final cost.
Yet on some public-sector projects, the independent QS may receive the priced Bills of Quantities only after the contractor has effectively been selected, leaving the professional team to deal with serious pricing anomalies or omissions after the most important procurement decision has already been made.
That seems the wrong way around.
A difficult market creates difficult tendering conditions
Recent Bureau for Economic Research construction surveys point to a difficult trading environment characterised by weak demand, depressed activity and strong competition for available work.
The detailed BER survey information is available to subscribers and is therefore not reproduced here. Nevertheless, the broad economic issue deserves consideration.
A contractor does not stop incurring costs because there is insufficient work.
Permanent staff must still be paid. Offices, plant, insurance and finance commitments continue. Skilled employees must be retained if the contractor wishes to remain capable of undertaking future work.
Consequently, when too many contractors are chasing too little work, securing the next project can become a matter of survival.
That creates a potentially dangerous commercial progression:
Insufficient work → intense tender competition → pressure on prices → reduced margins → less capacity to absorb risk.
A contractor may eventually face an unenviable choice: tender at what it believes is a sustainable price and possibly secure no work, or price extremely aggressively and hope that circumstances during construction allow it to survive.
That does not mean every low tender is unsustainable.
It means that an unusually low tender deserves investigation rather than celebration.
Lowest price is not necessarily lowest ultimate cost
Suppose the QS's pre-tender estimate for a project is R100 million.
Four tenders arrive:
R101 million — R99 million — R97 million — R82 million.
The R82 million tender may be entirely legitimate.
Perhaps that contractor owns its plant, has negotiated exceptional supplier prices, has developed a more efficient construction method or genuinely operates at lower overheads.
But there are other possibilities.
Has something been omitted?
Are important rates unrealistically low?
Are the preliminaries sufficient for the proposed construction period?
Has the contractor misunderstood part of the documentation?
Have contractual risks been inadequately priced?
Has the contractor allowed sufficient working capital?
Or is the contractor simply buying the work?
The correct response should not automatically be:
Reject the lowest tender.
Nor should it automatically be:
Accept the saving.
It should be:
Explain the difference.
Someone with appropriate construction-cost expertise should investigate that difference before R82 million becomes a binding construction contract.
Interestingly, the procurement system already recognises this risk
This is where our research produced an important finding.
The CIDB describes its Register of Contractors as a macro risk-management tool. But CIDB goes further: the public-sector client remains responsible for ensuring that the contractor's capacity, competence, expertise, experience and financial capability match the requirements of the particular project.
In other words, registration and grading do not remove the client's responsibility to undertake appropriate due diligence.
That distinction is important.
A contractor's CIDB grading is essential to public construction procurement, but grading cannot by itself answer the project-specific question:
Can this contractor deliver this particular project, at this particular price, at this particular time, while carrying its existing commitments?
That requires further professional judgement.
CIDB tender-evaluation guidance also recognises commercial risk associated with tender prices, including the risks presented by unduly high or unduly low tendered rates or amounts.
Perhaps the problem, therefore, is not that South Africa lacks procurement principles.
The question may instead be:
Are we consistently applying the available professional expertise at the point where it matters most?
The Four C's
Perhaps contractor due diligence can be reduced to four straightforward questions.
Capability — Can they do it?
Does the contractor possess the technical skills, management expertise, experience, personnel, systems and track record required for this particular project?
Capacity — Can they do it now?
A capable contractor may already have several major projects underway.
Does it have sufficient management, supervision, labour, plant and other resources available to take on another?
Capability and capacity are not the same thing.
Cash Flow — Can they finance it?
Construction requires expenditure before recovery.
Wages, materials, plant, subcontractors and site overheads must be funded while the contractor waits for measurement, certification and payment.
What working capital will this project require?
What happens if payment is delayed?
Can the contractor absorb an unexpected event without the site grinding to a halt?
Credibility — Does all the evidence make sense?
Capability + Capacity + Cash Flow should collectively help establish credibility.
Not reputation.
Not presentation.
Not promises.
Evidence.
The Four C's should not become another arbitrary scoring mechanism. They are simply a useful way of asking whether the contractor who looks attractive on the tender summary is also capable of delivering the contract in the real world.
Importantly, the underlying principles are consistent with CIDB requirements that clients satisfy themselves about the capacity, competence, expertise, experience and financial capability of contractors they appoint.
Cash flow deserves particular attention
A technically competent contractor can still fail because it runs out of cash.
Construction businesses incur expenditure before receiving payment. Labour must be paid, materials purchased, plant operated and subcontractors funded while the contractor waits for valuation, certification and eventual payment.
Add delayed employer payment and the pressure increases substantially.
Government itself has recognised cash-flow problems as an important contributor to stalled projects.
Under the South African Construction Action Plan (SACAP), government has proposed measures including stronger protection of project budgets, improved monitoring of payments and intervention where financial blockages threaten project delivery.
This raises another pre-award question:
Before appointing a contractor, has anyone established the likely cash-flow burden that this particular project will place on that business?
A quantity surveyor is well placed to model anticipated construction cash flow.
It cannot guarantee that the contractor will survive.
But it may identify a risk that everyone would otherwise discover six months later when subcontractors stop arriving on site.
Contractor development must remain development
South Africa needs new contractors.
Transformation of the construction industry and development of emerging enterprises are necessary for the long-term health of the industry.
But there is an important difference between creating opportunity and creating exposure.
We would not give a learner driver the keys to a 30-ton truck merely because the country needs more truck drivers.
We train the driver, assess competence and progressively increase responsibility.
Why should contractor development be fundamentally different?
A developing contractor should receive genuine opportunities to grow, supported where appropriate by mentoring, joint ventures, financial assistance, technical support and progressively more demanding projects.
But appointing a contractor to a project materially beyond its present capability, capacity or financial resources may not develop that contractor.
It may destroy it.
And it may damage the client, subcontractors and the project at the same time.
We have been saying this for nearly a decade
Interestingly, the proposition that quantity surveyors should be more closely involved in contractor selection is not new.
In February 2017, ASAQS published an article entitled Prevent corruption on government projects through the use of Quantity Surveyors.
The article argued that quantity surveyors should be involved from project initiation, including planning, feasibility and procurement strategy.
It also made a particularly relevant observation: an important issue in any project is ensuring that the tender is awarded to the right contractor at the right price. The QS's Bills of Quantities and professional expertise provide the client with valuable information for judging tenders before award.
Almost a decade later, government is introducing Procurement War Rooms and attempting to address contractor failure, procurement weaknesses, cash-flow problems and infrastructure delivery.
Perhaps it is time to revisit that advice.
Where is the Quantity Surveyor?
Government's SACAP programme makes this discussion particularly timely.
One of its interventions is the establishment of Procurement War Rooms within Public Works.
The published description refers to bringing together supply-chain specialists, legal advisers, engineers and project managers to monitor awards, identify blockages and accelerate tender evaluations.
That is encouraging.
But it raises an obvious question:
Where is the Quantity Surveyor?
If one of the risks under consideration is whether a construction price is commercially credible, surely the profession specialising in construction economics, measurement, pricing, cash flow and cost risk should have a seat at the table.
This becomes even more interesting because another SACAP intervention is the professionalisation of the built environment, which expressly includes registered quantity surveyors alongside the other built-environment professions.
Professionalisation should surely mean more than requiring registration.
It should mean using each profession's expertise at the point where that expertise can add value.
We are not suggesting that the QS appoint the contractor
This distinction is crucial.
The independent quantity surveyor should not select the successful government tenderer.
That decision belongs to the properly constituted procurement authority applying the applicable legislation, tender conditions and disclosed evaluation methodology.
Nor should the QS introduce new evaluation criteria after tenders have closed merely because the result appears undesirable.
Fairness, transparency and equal treatment of tenderers remain fundamental.
What we propose is something much simpler.
An Independent Commercial Tender Risk Report
For significant public-sector construction contracts, consideration should be given to requiring an independent registered quantity surveyor to provide a formal Commercial Tender Risk Report before final award.
It need not score the tender.
It need not select the contractor.
Its purpose would be to identify the commercial risks that the procurement authority ought to understand before making its decision.
The QS could examine matters including:
- the relationship between the tender and the pre-tender estimate;
- abnormally high or low rates;
- apparent omissions;
- adequacy of preliminaries;
- unbalanced pricing;
- the relationship between price and proposed programme;
- anticipated construction cash flow;
- significant subcontract allowances;
- current market pricing;
- the commercial consequences of proposed risk allocation; and
- other material pricing anomalies requiring clarification.
Where an abnormality is identified, the tenderer should have the procedurally appropriate opportunity to explain it.
There may be a perfectly good explanation.
If there is, government has gained confidence in the tender.
If there isn't, government has discovered the problem before signing the contract.
That is not interference with procurement.
That is risk management.
Prevention must be better than blacklisting
SACAP also proposes stronger measures intended to prevent contractors who have seriously underperformed from simply moving on to another government contract.
Consequence management is necessary.
But blacklisting happens after something has gone wrong.
By then the school may be unfinished.
The clinic may be standing half-built.
Subcontractors may be unpaid.
The employer may face termination costs, additional professional fees, deterioration of incomplete works and the expense of appointing another contractor.
So, before asking:
“Should this contractor be prevented from receiving another government contract?”
perhaps we should first ask:
“What warning signs were visible before we awarded this one?”
Perhaps we are asking the wrong question
When another contractor fails, we invariably ask:
What went wrong with the contractor?
Perhaps we should also ask:
What did we know before we appointed the contractor?
Did we test capability?
Did we establish capacity?
Did we examine cash flow?
Did we interrogate abnormal rates?
Did we investigate apparent omissions?
Did we compare the tender meaningfully with the pre-tender estimate?
Did we consider whether the programme could realistically be delivered for the amount tendered?
And did an independent construction-cost professional put those commercial risks before the people making the appointment?
If the answer is no, then some contractor failures may not be contractor failures alone.
They may also be procurement failures.
South Africa does not need quantity surveyors to take over public procurement.
It needs procurement authorities to make decisions with the best available professional information.
CIDB already places responsibility on the client to satisfy itself that the contractor's capacity, competence, expertise, experience and financial capability match the particular project.
SACAP seeks to improve procurement, contractor performance, cash flow, professionalisation and project oversight.
Perhaps the next step is surprisingly simple:
Before a significant public-sector construction tender becomes a construction contract, let an independent registered quantity surveyor tell the decision-makers what commercial risks they are accepting.
The procurement authority should still make the appointment.
But it should make that appointment with its eyes open.
Because discovering that a tender was commercially unsustainable after the contractor has failed is not cost management.
It is post-mortem accounting.
References and Further Reading
1. Association of South African Quantity Surveyors — Procurement Strategies
ASAQS FAQ material dealing with procurement selection, tender adjudication, contractor capability and the dangers associated with focusing on lowest price.
https://www.asaqs.co.za/page/Procurement_Strategies
2. Association of South African Quantity Surveyors — QS Functions
Professional functions of the quantity surveyor, including procurement strategies, risk analysis, tendering, cost management and value-for-money assessment.
https://www.asaqs.co.za/page/FAQQSFunctions
3. Construction Industry Development Board — Applying the Register of Contractors
CIDB guidance explaining the Register as a macro risk-management tool and the client's responsibility for contractor due diligence, including capacity, competence, expertise, experience and financial capability.
https://www.cidb.org.za/clients/procurement-guides/applying-register-of-contractors/
4. Construction Industry Development Board — Evaluating Tender Offers / Procurement Guidance
CIDB guidance covering tender evaluation and commercial risk considerations.
https://www.cidb.org.za/clients/procurement-guides/evaluating-tenders/
5. South African Government — South African Construction Action Plan (SACAP)
Department of Public Works and Infrastructure programme addressing procurement, contractor performance, project cash flow, governance, Procurement War Rooms and professionalisation.
https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-dean-macpherson-press-briefing-south-african-construction-action-plan-sacap
6. Association of South African Quantity Surveyors — Prevent corruption on government projects through the use of Quantity Surveyors, 27 February 2017
An earlier ASAQS argument for QS involvement from project initiation and procurement strategy through tender evaluation and contractor appointment.
https://www.asaqs.co.za/news/332737/Prevent-corruption-on-government-projects-through-the-use-of-Quantity-Surveyors.htm
7. Bureau for Economic Research — Building and Construction Surveys
BER construction research was used as background when considering prevailing construction-market conditions. Detailed subscriber-only survey results have deliberately not been reproduced.
https://www.ber.ac.za/Documents/Index/Building-and-Construction
Research and preparation
This article concludes the recent Weekend Property & Construction News examination of procurement strategies based on the ASAQS Procurement Strategies FAQs.
The research and development of this article were assisted by Google NotebookLM and OpenAI's ChatGPT, which were used to interrogate source material, explore relationships between contractor failure and procurement, and identify supporting evidence. The underlying propositions were subsequently checked against the cited source documents.
The opinions and proposals expressed remain those of the author.
This article first appeared on the ASAQS website. Questions about your own project? Contact us.